

Towards Trustworthy Aerospace Systems: An Experience Report

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Invited Talk at Formal Methods in Industrial Critical Systems
(FMICS'11)

joint work with Marco Bozzano, Alessandro Cimatti,
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Marco Roveri and Yuri Yushstein

Agenda

- 1 Introduction and Challenges
- 2 System Specification
 - Behavioural Modeling
 - Formal Semantics
 - Error Modelling
 - Property Specification
- 3 Analysis Facilities
- 4 Industrial Evaluation
- 5 Conclusions and Outlook

Overview

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 - Property Specification
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- 5 Conclusions and Outlook

Aerospace systems



Weather satellite

Aerospace systems



Weather satellite



Ariane 5

Aerospace systems



Weather satellite



Ariane 5



Space station ISS

Aerospace systems




Weather satellite



Ariane 5



Space station ISS



Mars Pathfinder

Aerospace systems




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GPS system with 26
satellites

Aerospace systems




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GPS system with 26 satellites



A Lego starwars ship

Extreme dependability!

- ▶ They must offer service without interruption for a very long time – typically years or decades.
- ▶ ‘Five nines’ dependability is not sufficient.
- ▶ Faults are costly and may severely damage reputations, e.g. Ariane 5.

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Challenges

- ▶ Rigorous design support and analysis techniques are called for.
- ▶ Bugs must be found as early as possible in the design process.
- ▶ Check performance and reliability guarantees whenever possible.
- ▶ The effect of Fault Diagnosis, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) measures must be quantifiable.

Current weaknesses and limitations

Software is mostly verified **in isolation** from the target hardware.

¹Fault Detection, Identification and Recovery

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Distinct modeling formalisms and analysis techniques for **different** system aspects.

Limited support for checking **timed, hybrid, and probabilistic** properties.

No coherent approach to study **effectiveness of FDIR** ¹

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Our objective

Develop an **integrated** system-software co-engineering approach to ensure completeness and consistency from heterogeneous specification and analysis techniques.

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Main ingredients should be a **general-purpose** modelling language, accompanied with a plethora of **formal analysis** techniques and supported by **powerful software tools**.

Current situation

Yes, "formal methods" are applied to aerospace systems, but not in a **coherent** manner at the **systems** engineering level.

COMPASS project partners

Consortium

- ▶ **RWTH Aachen University**
Software Modeling and Verification Group
- ▶ **Fondazione Bruno Kessler**
Embedded Systems Group
- ▶ **Thales Alenia Space**
World-wide #1 in satellite systems

Financial support + supervisor

- ▶ **European Space Agency**



Approach in a nutshell

Design a modeling language based on (core) AADL and its Error Annex.

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Support the system-engineering language by powerful **model-checking tools** for correctness, safety, performance and dependability analysis

Approach in a nutshell

Design a modeling language based on (core) **AADL and its Error Annex**.

Equip this modeling language with a **formal semantics**.

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Evaluate their effectiveness by **industrial case studies**.

COMPASS phases


1. Project kick-off February 2008
2. Language design
3. Software tool specification + software design document
4. Formal semantics October 2008
5. Prototype tool implementation April 2009
6. Prototype evaluation
7. Final tool implementation December 2009
8. Final tool evaluation March 2010
9. Project extension until March 2011
10. New projects (NPI, CGM) until December 2011

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Total budget: \approx 750 kEuro; at peak times \approx 10 programmers involved

Methodology



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The industry standard AADL

- **1989** MetaH
- **1998** SAE AS-2C
- **2004** AADL 1.0
- **2006** Error Annex 1.0
- **2009** AADL 2.0
- **2010** Error Annex 2.0

Paradigm

- ▶ Architecture-based and model-driven top-down and bottom-up engineering
- ▶ Real-time and performance critical distributed systems
- ▶ Complements component-based product-line development



GENERAL DYNAMICS



Software Engineering Institute | Carnegie Mellon




AADL example: redundant power system

Redundant power system

- ▶ Contains two batteries
- ▶ Power switches from **primary** to **backup** mode (and back) when **batt1** (**batt2**) is empty

We shall show:

- ▶ hybrid behaviour of the batteries
- ▶ composition of the power system
- ▶ formalisation to automata
- ▶ semantics as transition systems
- ▶ interweaving of errors



Modelling a battery in AADL

Component **type** and **implementation**:

```
device type Battery
```

```
end Battery;
```

```
device implementation Battery.Imp
```

```
end Battery.Imp;
```


Modelling a battery in AADL

Type defines the **interface**:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;
  end Battery;
device implementation Battery.Imp
```

```
end Battery.Imp;
```

Modelling a battery in AADL

Adding **modes behavior**:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;
  end Battery;
device implementation Battery.Imp
```

modes

charged: activation mode

depleted: mode

transitions

charged -[]-> charged;

charged -[empty]-> depleted;

depleted -[]-> depleted;

```
end Battery.Imp;
```


Modelling a battery in AADL

Adding **hybrid behavior**:

```

device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;
  end Battery;
device implementation Battery.Imp
  subcomponents
    energy: data continuous initially 100.0;
  modes
    charged: activation mode
      while energy'=-0.02 and energy>=20.0;
    depleted: mode
      while energy'=-0.03;
  transitions
    charged -[then voltage:=energy/50.0+4.0]-> charged;
    charged -[empty when energy<=20.0]-> depleted;
    depleted -[then voltage:=energy/50.0+4.0]-> depleted;
  end Battery.Imp;

```



Modeling a redundant power system in AADL

Power system with **battery subcomponents**:

```
system Power
  features
    voltage: out data port real;
end Power;
```

```
system implementation Power.Imp
  subcomponents
    batt1: device Battery.Imp
    batt2: device Battery.Imp
```

```
end Power.Imp;
```

Modeling a redundant power system in AADL


Adding **dynamic reconfiguration**:

```

system Power
  features
    voltage: out data port real;
  end Power;

system implementation Power.Imp
  subcomponents
    batt1: device Battery.Imp in modes (primary);
    batt2: device Battery.Imp in modes (backup);

  modes
    primary: initial mode;
    backup: mode;
  transitions
    primary -[batt1.empty]-> backup;
    backup -[batt2.empty]-> primary;
  end Power.Imp;
  
```



Modeling a redundant power system in AADL


Adding **port connections**:

```

system Power
  features
    voltage: out data port real;
  end Power;

system implementation Power.Imp
  subcomponents
    batt1: device Battery.Imp in modes (primary);
    batt2: device Battery.Imp in modes (backup);
  connections
    data port batt1.voltage -> voltage in modes (primary);
    data port batt2.voltage -> voltage in modes (backup);
  modes
    primary: initial mode;
    backup: mode;
  transitions
    primary -[batt1.empty]-> backup;
    backup -[batt2.empty]-> primary;
end Power.Imp;

```



Deviations from AADL

Omissions

Some advanced features of AADL such as property associations, component refinement, prototypes, **event data** ports, **in out** ports, ...

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Simplifications

(multi-way) synchronous communication (rather than asynchronous channel communication).

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Some advanced features of AADL such as property associations, component refinement, prototypes, **event data** ports, **in out** ports, ...

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(multi-way) synchronous communication (rather than asynchronous channel communication).

Extensions

- ▶ **default values** for data elements
- ▶ support for **mode/error state history** (upon component re-activation)
- ▶ **hybridity**, i.e., mode invariants, trajectory equations
- ▶ specification of **observability requirements**

Event-data automata

Definition (Event-data automaton)

An **event-data automaton (EDA)** is a tuple

$$\mathfrak{A} = (M, m_0, X, v_0, \iota, E, \rightarrow)$$

with

- ▶ M finite set of **modes**
 - ▶ $m_0 \in M$ **initial mode**
- ▶ $X = IX \uplus OX \uplus LX$ finite set of **input/output/local variables**
- ▶ $V := \{v \mid v : X \rightarrow \dots\}$ **valuations**
 - ▶ $v_0 \in V$ **initial valuation**
- ▶ $\iota : M \rightarrow (V \rightarrow \mathbb{B})$ **mode invariants** (where $\iota(m_0, v_0) = \text{true}$)
- ▶ $E = IE \uplus OE$ finite set of **input/output events**
- ▶ $\rightarrow \subseteq M \times \underbrace{E_{\tau}}_{\text{trigger}} \times \underbrace{(V \rightarrow \mathbb{B})}_{\text{guard}} \times \underbrace{(V \rightarrow V)}_{\text{effect}} \times M$
(mode) transition relation (where $E_{\tau} := E \cup \{\tau\}$)

Semantics of an AADL component

- ▶ AADL modes/invariants/transitions
 \rightsquigarrow EDA modes/invariants/transitions

Example (Battery)

- ▶ $M = \{\text{charged}, \text{depleted}\}$, $m_0 = \text{charged}$

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- ▶ $IX = \emptyset$, $OX = \{\text{voltage}\}$

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- ▶ Data subcomponents \rightsquigarrow local variables
- ▶ Incoming/outgoing event ports \rightsquigarrow input/output events

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- ▶ $M = \{\text{charged, depleted}\}$, $m_0 = \text{charged}$
- ▶ $IX = \emptyset$, $OX = \{\text{voltage}\}$
- ▶ $LX = \{\text{energy}\}$
- ▶ $IE = \emptyset$, $OE = \{\text{empty}\}$

Operational semantics of EDA

- ▶ **States** are pairs: a mode and a variable valuation
- ▶ **Transitions**: timed or internal or event-labeled

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Example (Battery)

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⟨mode = charged, energy = 100.0, voltage = 6.0⟩
```


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Example (Battery)

$\langle \text{mode} = \text{charged}, \text{energy} = 100.0, \text{voltage} = 6.0 \rangle$
↓ 30.0
 $\langle \text{mode} = \text{charged}, \text{energy} = 40.0, \text{voltage} = 6.0 \rangle$

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⟨mode = charged, energy = 100.0, voltage = 6.0⟩  
    ↓ 30.0  
⟨mode = charged, energy = 40.0, voltage = 6.0⟩  
    ↓ τ⟨voltage:=...⟩  
⟨mode = charged, energy = 40.0, voltage = 4.8⟩
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    ↓ 10.0  
⟨mode = charged, energy = 20.0, voltage = 4.8⟩
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⟨mode = charged, energy = 40.0, voltage = 4.8⟩  
    ↓ 10.0  
⟨mode = charged, energy = 20.0, voltage = 4.8⟩  
    ↓ τ⟨voltage:=...⟩  
⟨mode = charged, energy = 20.0, voltage = 4.4⟩
```

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
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  ↓ 10.0
⟨mode = charged, energy = 20.0, voltage = 4.8⟩
  ↓ τ⟨voltage:=...⟩
⟨mode = charged, energy = 20.0, voltage = 4.4⟩
  ↓ empty
⟨mode = depleted, energy = 20.0, voltage = 4.4⟩
```

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Example (Battery)



Networks of event-data automata

Dynamic reconfiguration

⇒ component activity and port connections **mode dependent**

Definition (Networks of Event-Data Automata)

A **network of event-data automata (NEDA)** is a tuple

$$\mathfrak{N} = ((\mathfrak{A}_i)_{i \in [n]}, \alpha, EC, DC)$$

with $n \geq 1$, $[n] := \{1, \dots, n\}$, and

- ▶ each \mathfrak{A}_i an **EDA** $\mathfrak{A}_i = (M_i, m_0^i, X_i, v_0^i, \iota_i, E_i, \rightarrow_i)$
- ▶ $M := \prod_{i=1}^n M_i$ set of **global modes**
- ▶ $\alpha : M \rightarrow 2^{[n]}$ **activation mapping**
- ▶ $EC : M \rightarrow (\{i.e \mid i \in [n], e \in E_i\})^2$ **event connection mapping**
- ▶ $DC : M \rightarrow (\{i.x \mid i \in [n], x \in X_i\})^2$ **data connection mapping**

Semantics of an entire AADL model

- ▶ AADL subcomponent declarations \rightsquigarrow activation mapping:
 - ▶ root component always **active**
 - ▶ c **active** and in mode m , subcomponent c' of c activated in m
 $\implies c'$ **active**


Example (Power System)

For **Power/Battery1/Battery2** ($m_1, m_2 \in \{\text{charged, depleted}\}$):

- ▶ $\alpha(\text{primary}, m_1, m_2) = \{1, 2\}$
 $\alpha(\text{backup}, m_1, m_2) = \{1, 3\}$

Semantics of an entire AADL model

- ▶ AADL event/data connections \rightsquigarrow *EC/DC* mappings:
follow all end-to-end **chains of port connections**



Example (Power System)

For *Power/Battery1/Battery2* ($m_1, m_2 \in \{\text{charged, depleted}\}$):

- ▶ $EC(\text{primary}, m_1, m_2) = \{(2.\text{empty}, 1.\text{batt1}.\text{empty})\}$
- $EC(\text{backup}, m_1, m_2) = \{(3.\text{empty}, 1.\text{batt2}.\text{empty})\}$
- $DC(\text{primary}, m_1, m_2) = \{(2.\text{voltage}, 1.\text{voltage})\}$
- $DC(\text{backup}, m_1, m_2) = \{(3.\text{voltage}, 1.\text{voltage})\}$

Operational semantics of networks of EDAs

- ▶ **States** := $(M_1 \times V_1) \times \dots \times (M_n \times V_n)$
- ▶ **Transitions** determined by active EDAs:
 1. Perform local transitions:
 - ▶ timed local transition in all EDAs or
 - ▶ internal transition in EDA or
 - ▶ multi-way event communication from EDA to ≥ 1 connected EDAs
 2. Initialize (re-)activated subcomponents
 3. Establish consistency w.r.t. *DC* (copy source \rightarrow target data port)

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Example (Power system)

$\langle m = \text{primary}, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \text{charged}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \text{charged}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle$

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↓ 40.0

$$\langle m = \underline{\text{primary}}, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 20.0, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \text{charged}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle$$

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 \quad \downarrow 40.0 \\
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 \quad \downarrow \tau \langle \text{voltage} := \dots \rangle \\
 \langle m = \underline{\text{primary}}, v = 4.4 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 20.0, v = 4.4 \rangle \mid \langle m = \text{charged}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle
 \end{array}$$

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Example (Power system)

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 \langle m = \underline{\text{primary}}, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle \\
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 \langle m = \underline{\text{primary}}, v = 4.4 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 20.0, v = 4.4 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle \\
 \quad \downarrow \tau \langle \text{empty} \rangle \\
 \langle m = \underline{\text{backup}}, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{depleted}}, e = 20.0, v = 4.4 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle
 \end{array}$$

Operational semantics of networks of EDAs

- ▶ States := $(M_1 \times V_1) \times \dots \times (M_n \times V_n)$
- ▶ Transitions determined by active EDAs:
 1. Perform local transitions:
 - ▶ **timed local transition in all EDAs** or
 - ▶ internal transition in EDA or
 - ▶ multi-way event communication from EDA to ≥ 1 connected EDAs
 2. Initialize (re-)activated subcomponents
 3. Establish consistency w.r.t. *DC* (copy source \rightarrow target data port)

Example (Power system)

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \langle m = \underline{\text{primary}}, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle \mid \langle m = \underline{\text{charged}}, e = 100.0, v = 6.0 \rangle \\
 \quad \downarrow 40.0 \\
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 \quad \downarrow \dots
 \end{array}$$

Error modelling

```
error model BatteryFailure
  features
    ok: initial state;
    dead: error state;
    batteryDied: out error propagation;
end BatteryFailure;

error model implementation BatteryFailure.Imp
  events
    fault: error event occurrence poisson 0.01;
  transitions
    ok -[fault]-> dead;
    dead -[batteryDied]-> dead;
end BatteryFailure.Imp;
```

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    ok -[fault]-> dead;
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end BatteryFailure.Imp;
```

Repair

`reset` events (not in example) can be sent from nominal to error model of same component to attempt to repair the occurred fault.

Error modelling

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error model BatteryFailure
  features
    ok: initial state;
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    batteryDied: out error propagation;
end BatteryFailure;

error model implementation BatteryFailure.Imp
  events
    fault: error event occurrence poisson 0.01;
  transitions
    ok -[fault]-> dead;
    dead -[batteryDied]-> dead;
end BatteryFailure.Imp;
```

Fault injection

An error model does not influence the nominal behaviour unless they are linked through **fault injection**.

Error modelling

```
error model BatteryFailure
  features
    ok: initial state;
    dead: error state;
    batteryDied: out error propagation;
end BatteryFailure;

error model implementation BatteryFailure.Imp
  events
    fault: error event occurrence poisson 0.01;
  transitions
    ok -[fault]-> dead;
    dead -[batteryDied]-> dead;
end BatteryFailure.Imp;
```

Fault injection

A fault injection (s, d, a) means that on entering error state s , the assignment $d := a$ is performed, where d is a data subcomponent and a the fault effect.

Error modelling

```
error model BatteryFailure
  features
    ok: initial state;
    dead: error state;
    batteryDied: out error propagation;
end BatteryFailure;

error model implementation BatteryFailure.Imp
  events
    fault: error event occurrence poisson 0.01;
  transitions
    ok -[fault]-> dead;
    dead -[batteryDied]-> dead;
end BatteryFailure.Imp;
```

Fault injection example

In error state `dead`, `voltage:=0`

Model extension

Nominal model + error model + fault injections = *extended model*

- ▶ Modes are pairs of nominal modes and error model states
 - ▶ Starting mode = (the original starting mode, the starting error state)
- ▶ Set of event ports +:= the error propagations
- ▶ Event port connections +:= propagation port connections
- ▶ Transition relation := all possible **interleavings** and **interactions** between nominal and error model, taking failure effects into account
- ▶ Other elements (e.g., mode invariants) are unaffected

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- ▶ Other elements (e.g., mode invariants) are unaffected

Probabilistic error transitions

As an error model has probabilistic transitions, our semantical model has to be equipped with such transitions.

This yields **interactive Markov chains** := LTS + Markov chains.

Battery component

Nominal specification:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;

end Battery;

device implementation Battery.Imp
  subcomponents
    energy: data continuous initially 100.0;
  modes
    charged: activation mode while ...;
    depleted: mode while ...;
  transitions
    charged -[then voltage:=...]-> charged;
    charged -[empty when energy<=20.0]-> depleted;
    depleted -[then voltage:=...]-> depleted;
```


Battery component after **model extension**

Product construction for modes:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;

end Battery;

device implementation Battery.Imp
  subcomponents
    energy: data continuous initially 100.0;
  modes
    charged#ok: activation mode while ...;
    depleted#ok, charged#dead, depleted#dead: mode while ...;
  transitions
    charged -[then voltage:=...]-> charged;
    charged -[empty when energy<=20.0]-> depleted;
    depleted -[then voltage:=...]-> depleted;
```

Battery component after **model extension**

Integrate **nominal transitions**:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;

end Battery;

device implementation Battery.Imp
  subcomponents
    energy: data continuous initially 100.0;
  modes
    charged#ok: activation mode while ...;
    depleted#ok, charged#dead, depleted#dead: mode while ...;
  transitions
    charged#ok -[then voltage:=...]-> charged#ok;
    charged#ok -[empty when energy<=20.0]-> depleted#ok;
    depleted#ok -[then voltage:=...]-> depleted#ok;
```

Battery component after **model extension**

Fault injection:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;

end Battery;

device implementation Battery.Imp
  subcomponents
    energy: data continuous initially 100.0;
  modes
    charged#ok: activation mode while ...;
    depleted#ok, charged#dead, depleted#dead: mode while ...;
  transitions
    charged#ok -[then voltage:=...] -> charged#ok;
    charged#ok -[empty when energy<=20.0] -> depleted#ok;
    depleted#ok -[then voltage:=...] -> depleted#ok;
    charged#ok -[prob 0.001 then voltage:=0] -> charged#dead;
    depleted#ok -[prob 0.001 then voltage:=0] -> depleted#dead;
```

Battery component after model extension

Nominal transitions with fault effects:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;

end Battery;

device implementation Battery.Imp
  subcomponents
    energy: data continuous initially 100.0;
  modes
    charged#ok: activation mode while ...;
    depleted#ok, charged#dead, depleted#dead: mode while ...;
  transitions
    charged#ok -[then voltage:=...] -> charged#ok;
    charged#ok -[empty when energy<=20.0] -> depleted#ok;
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    depleted#ok -[prob 0.001 then voltage:=0] -> depleted#dead;
    charged#dead -[then voltage:=0] -> charged#dead;
    charged#dead -[empty when energy<=20.0] -> depleted#dead;
    depleted#dead -[then voltage:=0] -> depleted#dead;
```


Battery component after **model extension**

Add **error propagations**:

```
device type Battery
  features
    empty: out event port;
    voltage: out data port real initially 6.0;
    batteryDied: out event port;
end Battery;

device implementation Battery.Imp
  subcomponents
    energy: data continuous initially 100.0;
  modes
    charged#ok: activation mode while ...;
    depleted#ok, charged#dead, depleted#dead: mode while ...;
  transitions
    charged#ok -[then voltage:=...] -> charged#ok;
    charged#ok -[empty when energy<=20.0] -> depleted#ok;
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    charged#dead -[then voltage:=0] -> charged#dead;
    charged#dead -[empty when energy<=20.0] -> depleted#dead;
    depleted#dead -[then voltage:=0] -> depleted#dead;
    depleted#dead -[batteryDied] -> depleted#dead;
```

The complete power system model



Specifying observability

- ▶ Specification of **observables** for diagnosability analysis
 - ▶ for outgoing data ports of type **bool**
- ▶ Example:

```
system PowerSystem
  features
    voltage: out data port real;
    alarm: out data port bool initially false observable;
end PowerSystem;

system implementation PowerSystem.Imp
  subcomponents
    pow: system Power.Imp;
  connections
    data port pow.voltage -> voltage;
  modes
    normal: initial mode;
    critical: mode;
  transitions
    normal -[when voltage<4.5 then alarm:=true]-> critical;
    critical -[when voltage>5.5 then alarm:=false]-> normal;
end PowerSystem.Imp;
```

Property specification: Patterns, no formulas!

Examples

- ▶ *The system shall have a behaviour where with probability higher than p it is the case that Φ holds continuously within time bound $[t_1, t_2]$.*
- ▶ *The system shall have a behaviour where Φ globally holds.*

Property specification: Patterns, no formulas!

Examples

- ▶ *The system shall have a behaviour where with probability higher than 0.98 it is the case that $\text{voltage} \geq 80$ holds continuously within time bound $[0, 10]$.*
- ▶ *The system shall have a behaviour where $x \leq y$ globally holds.*

Property specification: Patterns, no formulas!

Examples

- ▶ $\mathbb{P}_{>0.98} \left(\square^{[0,10]}(\text{voltage} \geq 80) \right)$
- ▶ $\square(x \leq y)$

Property specification: Patterns, no formulas!

Examples

- ▶ $\mathbb{P}_{>0.98} \left(\square^{[0,10]} (\text{voltage} \geq 80) \right)$
- ▶ $\square(x \leq y)$

Implemented pattern systems

Formalism	Intended use	Authors
CTL, LTL	functional properties	[Dwyer et al., 1999]
MTL, TCTL	real-time properties	[Konrad & Cheng, 2005]
PCTL, CSL	probabilistic properties	[Grunske, 2008]

Overview

- 1 Introduction and Challenges
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 - Behavioural Modeling
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- 3 Analysis Facilities
- 4 Industrial Evaluation
- 5 Conclusions and Outlook

Types of analysis

1. Validation

- ▶ check logical consistency of logical specification

2. Model checking

- ▶ property patterns, BMC, BDD-based MC, SMT for hybrid

3. Safety and dependability

- ▶ FMEA (impact fault modes on events), dynamic FTA

4. Diagnosability

- ▶ FDIR

5. Performance evaluation

- ▶ using probabilistic model checking
- ▶ effective model reduction techniques

Tool components

NuSMV

- ▶ Symbolic LTL and CTL model checker
- ▶ BDD- and SAT-based model checking
- ▶ Counterexample generation

RAT

- ▶ Requirements analyser
- ▶ Checks logical consistency

FSAP

- ▶ Safety analyser
- ▶ Fault-tree analysis


MRMC

- ▶ Model checker for MRMs
- ▶ Logics: PCTL and CSL (+rewards)
- ▶ Numerical + DES engine
- ▶ Bisimulation minimisation

SigRef

- ▶ (MT)BDD bisimulation minimisation
- ▶ Models: Markov chains

Tool architecture



Model checking view

Compass Prototype Tool

File Edit View Activities Help

Model Properties Validation **Correctness** Performability Safety FDIR


Properties

Name

observe output
 always output is

Model Checking Model Simulation


You selected %s to be model checked.

 Model extended by Fault Injections

Model Checker Options:

Use BDD (CTL and LTL)
 Use SAT (LTL only)

SAT Bound: Use SBMC Try to Complete

 **The property is false**
The LTL property:
G !output
has been found **false**. A counter-example is shown below.

Name	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4	Step5	Step6
mode	init	gone_rnd2	gone_rnd12	gone_bit2	gone_bit12	gone_bit12
run	0	0	0	0	0	0
rnd1.output	0	0	0	0	0	0
rnd2.output	0	1	1	1	1	1

Simulator view

Applications Places System Fri Apr 24, 11:01 AM USA Viet Yen Nguyen

Compass Prototype Tool

File Edit View Activities Help

Model Properties Validation Correctness Performability Safety FDIR

Properties

Name Formula

Model Checking Model Simulation

You selected %s as constraints for the simulation.
Simulation current length is %d.

Run Model Simulation Model extended by Fault Injections

Simulation Options:
Length: 10


Simulation

A simulation exists and it is shown by the following trace

Name	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4	Step5	Step6	Step7
sensors.switch	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
filters.switch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
sensors.mode	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Backup	Backup	Backup
sensors.sensor1.output	1	1	1	15	15	15	15
sensors.sensor1.error	OK	Glitched	OK	Dead	Dead	Dead	Dead
sensors.sensor2.output	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
sensors.sensor2.error	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	Glitched	OK
filters.mode	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary
filters.filter1.output	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
filters.filter1.error	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
filters.filter2.output	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
filters.filter2.error	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
value	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
mode	..ultInitialMode	..ultInitialMode	..ultInitialMode	..ultInitialMode	..ultInitialMode	..ultInitialMode	..ultInitialMode

[vietyen@vietyen-des... Compass Prototype Tool]


Performance view



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Case study: Satellite thermal regulation



Challenges:

- ▶ Hardware (sensors, heaters) and software (control) **co-engineering**
- ▶ **Hybrid** behavior (temperatures)
- ▶ Dynamic **reconfiguration** (redundancy)
- ▶ **State-space explosion**

Case study: Satellite FDIR system

Goal

Assess **effectiveness of FDIR** measures

Model components:

- ▶ **satellite mode management** during transfer-to-orbit phase
- ▶ **AOCS** (Attitude and Orbit Control System) mode management
- ▶ abstraction of **AOCS equipment** (sensors, gyroscope, ...)
- ▶ FDIR **action sequence**

Case study: Satellite FDIR system

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
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Analysis problems:

- ▶ identification of failures leading to a given **FDIR level**
- ▶ identification of failures entailing a **system reconfiguration**
- ▶ impact of reconfiguration on **satellite and AOCS mode**

Scalability



Case study: Satellite of project


Launches between 2012-2020

Case study: Satellite of project XXXXXXXXXX


Launches between 2012-2020

Satellite

Payload



Platform



Payload is mission-specific equipment, e.g.:


- ▶ telecom transponders,
- ▶ navigation signals,
- ▶ earth observation telemetry (weather, radiation, salinity).

Case study: Satellite of project XXXXXXXXXX


Launches between 2012-2020

Satellite

Payload



Platform



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- ▶ navigation signals,
- ▶ earth observation telemetry (weather, radiation, salinity).

Platform keeps the satellite orbiting in space, consists of:

- ▶ attitude & orbital control
- ▶ power distribution
- ▶ data handling
- ▶ communications
- ▶ thermal regulation

AADL model of satellite platform

Verification & validation objectives

- ▶ Ensure nominal and degraded conditions are handled correctly by the fault management system.
- ▶ Ensure performance and risks are within specified limits.

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- ✓ Real-time
- ✓ Hybrid

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Model characteristics

✓ Functional	Components:	99
✓ Probabilistic	Modes:	217
✓ Real-time	Faults:	21
✓ Hybrid	Recoveries:	9

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Requirement metrics

- ▶ Functional properties: 32
- ▶ Probabilistic: 2

Analysis results

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Correctness and (static) fault tree analysis

Setup: Intel Xeon 2.33 GHz machine with 16 GB RAM.

Analysis	Time
Deadlock checking	173 sec
Model checking “processor alarms only raised on failure”	4 min
Model checking “nominal AOCS thrusters”	102 min
Fault tree analysis “switch to safe modes”	51 min

Analysis results

Correctness and (static) fault tree analysis

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Setup: AMD Opteron 6172 with 192 GB RAM.

Analysis	Time
Fault detection observables of “processor module”	88 min
Diagnosability of “earth sensors”	> 2.5 days
FMEA table generation	to do
Dynamic fault tree analysis	to do
Performance evaluation	to do

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 - ▶ found several design inconsistencies in satellite case study
 - ▶ better understanding of system behaviour under (multiple) failures.
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 - ▶ found several design inconsistencies in satellite case study
 - ▶ better understanding of system behaviour under (multiple) failures.
 - ▶ **Improved safety analysis due to automatic FMEA/FT generation.**
- No (automatic) link AADL to **engineering** models (UML, Simulink)
 - ▶ integration into engineering tool suite
- **Tool set performance** on timed and hybrid systems further study

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- 1 Introduction and Challenges
- 2 System Specification
 - Behavioural Modeling
 - Formal Semantics
 - Error Modelling
 - Property Specification
- 3 Analysis Facilities
- 4 Industrial Evaluation
- 5 Conclusions and Outlook

Related work

Formal AADL semantics:

- ▶ Component-based semantics using BIP [Sifakis *et al.*, 2008]
- ▶ Arcade: AADL error annex [Stoelinga *et al.*, 2007]
- ▶ GSPN semantics [Kanoun *et al.*, 2007]
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AADL Analysis Tools:

- ▶ AADL2BIP tool (simulation, deadlock detection) [Sifakis *et al.*, 2008]
- ▶ ADeS simulator www.axlor.fr
- ▶ Real-time scheduling tools Cheddar, Furness
- ▶

Epilogue

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Future and current activities:

- ▶ Graphical modelling tool (ESA funded)
- ▶ Contribution to AADL standardization
- ▶ FMEA reduction, FDIR synthesis, and slicing (ESA funded)
- ▶ Compositional model checking (ESA funded)

FMEA reduction

Model	#Classical	#Compact
Thermal regulation (C1)	7	7
Thermal regulation (C2)	67	32
Acquisition (C2)	3	3
Acquisition (C3)	31	4
Command (C1)	1	1
Command (C2)	12	1
Control and Monitoring (C1)	1	1
Control and Monitoring (C2)	12	1
Heating (C1)	1	1
Heating (C2)	13	2
Passive units (C1)	4	4
Passive units (C2)	42	10

Further information

- ▶ Overview paper (Yushstein et. al, [IEEE SMC-IT 2011](#))
- ▶ AADL formal semantics (Bozzano et. al, [Computer J. 2011](#))
- ▶ Slicing of AADL specifications (Odenbrett et. al, [NASA FM 2010](#))
- ▶ AADL model checker (Bozzano et. al, [CAV 2010](#))
- ▶ Our variant of the AADL languages (Bozzano et. al, [MEMOCODE 2009](#))
- ▶ Tool download at <http://compass.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/>